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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SYRACUSE FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 280, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19276 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
Respondent. 
BLITMAN & KING, LLP (CHARLES E. BLITMAN of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
JOSEPH E. LAMENDOLA, CORPORATION COUNSEL (TERRI CONTI YORK 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions taken by the Syracuse Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 280, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge against the City of Syracuse (City). The Association 
alleges in this charge, as amended, that the City refused to negotiate in violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
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created a hearing procedure which it used to determine that two unit employees were 
no longer eligible for benefits under General Municipal Law (GML) §207-a.1 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge. The ALJ found that the City's 
Fire Chief, James Cummings, had decided to terminate the GML §207-a benefits of two 
unitemployees-who,_in--Cummingslopinion,-had-refused_or-failedio-perform-theJight 
duty2 assignments given them. Cummings nonetheless afforded the employees an 
opportunity to attend a hearing to explain why their benefits should not be canceled.3 
Stating that the City was not obligated to conduct any hearing before the employees' 
GML §207-a benefits were terminated, the ALJ found that there had not been any 
change in practice because the GML §207-a hearings which were held before a 
hearing officer selected by Cummings were similar to the "name clearing" and 
disciplinary hearings which had been held under procedures found in Givil Service Law 
(CSL) §75.4 As an additional basis for the dismissal of the charge, the ALJ held that the 
1GML §207-a provides for the payment of salary and medical and hospital 
expenses of fire fighters who have sustained injuries or illnesses during the 
performance of their duties. 
2GML §207-a(3) allows a municipality to offer a light duty assignment to a fire 
fighter who is capable of performing the light duty. Under GML §207-a(3), benefits 
"shall be discontinued" for a fire fighter who refuses a light duty assignment if the 
assignment satisfies the statutory conditions. 
3One employee attended the hearing, the other did not. 
4CSL §75 establishes substantive and procedural protections for many civil 
service employees facing discipline. 
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"plain language of GML §207-a as it relates to light duty circumscribes any bargaining 
mandate." 
The Association argues that the ALJ's decision is incorrect as a matter of fact 
and law in all material respects. The City argues in response that the ALJ's decision is 
correctand-should-be-affirmed 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, including 
those at oral argument, we reverse the ALJ's decision. The GML §207-a hearing 
procedures are mandatory subjects of negotiation, the City was not exempted by law or 
policy from its duty to negotiate and the hearings held by the City unilaterally changed 
its practice. 
) To begin, such disagreement the parties may have as to whether there must be 
by law some type of hearing before GML §207-a benefits can be terminated in a light 
duty situation is immaterial to our analysis of the City's bargaining obligations under the 
Act. 
If benefit termination hearings are not required as a matter of due process 
entitlement in a light duty situation, as the City may now be claiming,5 it ordered and 
held those hearings. Regardless of the City's motivation for that decision,6 and no 
5The City had argued to the ALJ that "decisional law has read a pre-termination 
rieanny requirement iruu [VJIVIU §^u/-aj uiuny nuuviia v. iuwn ui uic&iuGiy, 10 
A.D.2d 967 (2d Dep't 1980), appeal denied, 49 N.Y. 2d 708(1980) and Fiorella v. 
Village ofScarsdale, 96 Misc. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1978). 
6Cummings' testimony reveals that he was trying to protect the employees. 
Board - U-19276 -4 
matter how reasonable those procedures may have been,7 issues remain as to whether 
the hearing procedures which the City fashioned are mandatorily negotiable subjects 
and, if so, whether those procedures changed the City's practice. 
If a hearing of some type is required as a matter of constitutional due process 
before-benefits-can-be-terminated,-as4he-Association-claims-and-as-appears likely,? 
and assuming the City satisfied its constitutional obligations, it would still not be exempt 
from its duty to negotiate those hearing procedures nor would it have satisfied its 
statutory duty. The City's statutory duties are independent of and exceed its 
constitutional obligations. As was explained in County of Greene,9 the judicial decisions 
set only the constitutional due process minimums. The City is still obligated to satisfy 
its separate statutory duty to negotiate the procedures pursuant to which decisions are 
made as to whether the wages and economic benefits which are the subject of GML 
§207-a will be paid. 
The first issue for our consideration, therefore, is whether those hearing 
procedures are "terms and conditions of employment". This is not a new issue. The 
benefits payable to light duty employees under GML §207-a are wages, a term and 
7The reasonableness of an act is immaterial to its negotiability. 
^Giorgio v. Bucci, 246 A.D.2d 711 (3d Dep't 1998); Meehen v. County of 
lQinpruns, t. i s M.u./iu /1<+ (ou u e p i l aau j , rmmmuii v. o;ty u; oov/c//eotauy, t. I U r\.\-i. 
2d 843 (3d Dep't 1994); Curly v. Dilworth, 96 A.D.2d 903 (2d Dep't 1983); Uniform Fire 
Fighters ofCohoes v. City of Cohoes, 175 Misc. 2d 726 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1998). 
; 
925PERB H3045(1992). 
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condition of employment as defined in the Act.10 The procedures which a municipality 
uses to determine whether those wages will be paid, restricted, conditioned or denied 
are all incident to the payment of wages and are themselves terms and conditions of 
employment.11 Those terms and conditions of employment are subject to a duty to 
bargainunlesssome-other-prov-ision-otstate-law-plainly-andxlearly-expressesa -
contrary legislative intent or there is prohibitive public policy under statute, constitution 
or common law. 
In holding that the hearing procedures the City fashioned for use under GML 
§207-a need not be negotiated, the ALJ drew a distinction between the hearing 
procedures used to determine an employee's initial eligibility for GML §207-a benefits 
^ and ones used to assess continuing eligibility in a light duty context, noting that the 
former are mandatorily negotiable, but the latter are not. There is not, however, any 
difference in negotiability analysis whether the decision involves an initial determination 
of GML §207-a eligibility or a subsequent determination regarding an employee's 
continuing eligibility for benefits. Whether benefits are denied upon a determination 
that the injury or illness was not duty related, either initially or upon reexamination after 
an initial grant of benefits, or upon a determination that an employee has refused a light 
duty assignment which the employee is capable of performing, the result is still a loss of 
10 A —J. i " i n ^ A rtUl S^U I ."t. 
11
 E.g., Watertown Police Benevolent Ass'n, 30 PERB1J3072 (1997); Town of 
Cortlandt, 30 PERB 1J3031 (1997), conf'd, 30 PERB 1J7012 (Sup. Ct. Westchester 
County 1997). 
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salary and economic benefits. All are simply procedures used to determine whether 
wages and economic benefits will be paid and are mandatorily negotiable for that 
reason. 
The basis for the distinction the ALJ drew in holding that GML §207-a plainly 
—exempted4heCity fromany duty-to-negotiate-hearingprocedures-applicable-to-theloss-
of pay and benefits incident to a light duty determination is Schenectady Police 
Benevolent Association v. PERB (hereafter Schenectady).™ Schenectady is inapposite. 
The Court in Schenectady held only that the municipality was not required to 
bargain decisions ordering an employee to light duty and to submit to corrective surgery 
because those specific rights were conferred upon the municipality by the express 
~\ terms of the GML. Indeed, the Court of Appeals held that bargaining was required as 
to a broad medical confidentiality waiver precisely because nothing in the GML 
authorized or required the breadth of the disclosures demanded by the employer in 
Schenectady. 
GML §207-a, like GML §207-c, the counterpart for police officers, is as silent with 
respect to the procedures by which benefit eligibility determinations, whether initial or 
continuing, are made as it is with respect to medical confidentiality waiver. If the latter 
is bargainable, then so is the former for the same reason. 
; 
1285 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB 1J7005 (1995). 
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The duty to bargain all terms and conditions of employment is the strong and 
sweeping policy of the State.13 No plain and clear or inescapably implicit legislative 
intent to exempt the City from that duty to negotiate can be discerned under a statute 
which is entirely silent with respect to the procedures to be used to determine whether 
-GML-§207~-a-benefits-being-paid-should-be-discontinued-Jn-aJightduty-situation.™Nor^ 
can bargaining about what procedures should be used to determine eligibility for wages 
and benefits be viewed as contrary to public policy when public policy expressly favors 
negotiation of terms and conditions of employment. 
As the hearing procedures pertaining to a discontinuation of GML §207-a wages 
and benefits are terms and conditions of employment which have not been removed 
from the scope of mandatory negotiation by anything plain and clear in GML §207-a or 
public policy, the City was required to negotiate the content of those hearing 
procedures. Although it did not negotiate the procedure it used, this refusal to bargain 
charge is presented to us in the context of an alleged unilateral change in hearing 
practice. The violation alleged thus depends upon whether there has been a change in 
practice pertaining to that term and condition of employment. This brings us to the. 
other basis for the ALJ's dismissal of the charge. 
The ALJ held that there had not been a change in practice, even though the City 
had never before held any GML §207-a benefits termination hearings, because the 
hearing procedures used by the City for GML §207-a purposes were the same as or 
13
 E.g., Webster Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 75 N.Y. 2d 619, 23 PERB 
^[7013(1990); Vestal Employees Ass'n v. PERB, _ A.D.2d _ , 32 PERB 1J7007 (3d 
Dep't1999). 
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comparable to the "name clearing" and CSL §75-type hearings the City had used in the 
past. The ALJ's conclusion in this regard, however, conflicts with the Board's 
determination in Schenectady. 
In Schenectady, it was stated that the rights, duties and privileges of the parties 
—under-the-GML-are-unique-and-distinctfrom -all-others,-—-On thatrationale,4he- — 
employer's argument in Schenectady that its practices pertaining to claims under the 
Workers' Compensation Law afforded it the right to unilaterally extend those same 
hearing practices to GML §207-c claims was rejected. 
The Workers' Compensation Law practices in Schenectady paralleled that 
employer's GML practices to a far greater degree than do the name clearing and CSL 
§75 hearing procedures which the City urges as the basis of its argument that the GML 
§207-a hearings it held did not represent a change in practice. Just as the employer in 
Schenectady could not unilaterally borrow practices under one statutory scheme for 
use in another, the City is not afforded any greater right. 
The City argues, however, that the record establishes that its actual practice is to 
use CSL §75-type hearings whenever any hearing is held for any purpose, even in non-
disciplinary investigations. Other than Cummings' conclusory statement that the GML 
§207-a hearings he ordered were like the ones the City always held regardless of 
purpose, the record does not show a single instance of a CSL §75-type hearing being 
held in any matters other than disciplinary proceedings arising under the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement. Cummings' references to hearings were only to those 
14
 25 PERB 1T3022 (1992). This aspect of the case was not appealed. 
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arising in the context of the negotiated disciplinary procedure which affords unit 
employees a choice between a CSL §75-style hearing or arbitration. There is no 
evidence that the City has ever held a hearing in other than a disciplinary context. The 
hearing procedures applicable to those proceedings, which were created bilaterally, 
- ^ cannot-be-imposed-bythe City-unilaterally-as-the~procedures-to-be-followed--in-all~other--
hearings regardless of the purpose of those hearings. 
The Association established a change in practice upon proof that GML §207-a 
hearings were ordered and held and that there were never any hearings in that context 
before. It was the City's burden thereafter to establish that there really was no 
cognizable change in practice because the hearings it held were the same as those 
N
, held in comparable circumstances.15 There is no record evidence of comparable 
circumstances. Just as a failure or ambiguity of proof must be resolved against a 
charging party,16 a failure or ambiguity of proof in support of a defense to a charge must 
be resolved against a respondent.17 
We must next address a notice of claim issue left undecided by the ALJ because 
he dismissed the charge. We do so because there is no dispute of fact and the law is 
clear. 
''
5State of New York (Div. of Military and Naval Affairs), 24 HbKB n 3024 (1991), 
conf'd, 187 A.D.2d 78, 26 PERB 1J7001 (2d Dep't 1993). 
^County of Essex, 31 PERB fl 3026 (1998). 
^Schuylerville Cent Sen. Dist, 14 PERB U 3035 (1981). 
Board - U-19276 -10 
The City argues that §8-115 of its charter establishes a notice of claim 
requirement and that the Association must satisfy that notice requirement as a 
condition to the filing of an improper practice charge against it. 
The Act and our Rules of Procedure fix the exclusive conditions upon which 
_improper~practice chargesarefiled-and-processed-exceptas those conditions-are 
modified by other provisions of state law.18 Local law is valid only to the extent that it is 
consistent with state law.19 No state law imposes a duty to satisfy a notice of claim as a 
condition to a party bringing an improper practice charge against the City. A local law 
establishing additional conditions which must be satisfied before a party can bring a 
charge to us alleging that the Act has been violated conflicts irreconcilably with state 
") law and that local law is void to that extent. 
The City's notice of claim argument is also rejected because the City's charter 
provision is inapplicable by its terms to improper practice charges. The City's notice of 
) 
claim provision pertains only to an "action or special proceeding". An action or special 
proceeding is a civil judicial proceeding.20 Improper practice charges are not civil 
judicial actions or special proceedings. They are the administrative devices by which a 
party notifies the agency that unlawful activity may have occurred and the means by 
which the agency investigates and remedies violations of state law. 
18
 Compare N.Y. Educ. Law§3813 (establishing a state law notice requirement 
for claims against school districts). 
19
 Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Town ofRedhook, 60 N.Y.2d 99 
(1983). 
20N.Y.Civ.Prac.L&R.103 
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Whether the Association satisfied the notice of claim provisions of the City's 
charter is immaterial to our consideration of this charge and we do not reach that issue. 
We turn now to the issue of what remedy is appropriate for the City's unilateral 
imposition of the GML §207-a hearing procedures. In addition to the usual order 
^rescinding the-unilateraLcharge,-the-Association^argues-thatthe-GMU§207=a-benefits 
of the two employees should be restored retroactively because the hearings and the 
resulting hearing officer recommendations were factors in Cummings' decision to 
terminate their benefits. 
Although the hearings were admittedly a factor in Cummings' decisions, the ALJ 
found that the hearings and the resulting hearing officer decisions were not the 
"determinative factor" in Cummings' decision to terminate the employee's GML §207-a 
benefits. Indeed, the ALJ found that Cummings had decided to withdraw the 
employees' GML §207-a benefits before the hearings were even held. According to the 
ALJ, the hearing was a "last chance" for the employees "to provide such compelling 
evidence as would cause the retraction of the decision" if they wanted to take 
advantage of that opportunity. 
The ALJ's findings in these regards are supported by the record and upon those 
findings, an order restoring the employees' statutory benefits is not appropriate. In 
declining to order a restoration of benefits, we do not suggest, however, that a "last 
chance" benefits restoration hearing is consistent with the type of hearing which may be 
required by judicial decisions as a condition to a lawful benefits termination. That is an 
issue for determination, as necessary, in another forum. 
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! ' ' 
| There is an additional reason not to restore these employees' GML §207-a 
benefits. There is a substantial dispute between these parties as to whether the two 
i 
employees are eligible for GML §207-a benefits. GML §207-a requires the 
discontinuation of benefits if light duty is refused under the conditions prescribed by that 
i 
I-:---•-•—----statute,-TheCitybeIieves4haUhe.employees-did-refuseJheJight-duty^assignmentsJn— 
circumstances requiring the discontinuation of their benefits. The Association claims 
that the employees remain eligible for benefits primarily because they are not capable 
of working light duty, despite the City's belief to the contrary. That dispute is presently 
the subject of judicial proceedings which have been dismissed without prejudice 
I-
pending a final determination of this charge. An improper practice charge should not 
) be the mechanism to litigate and resolve disputed claims involving an employee's 
eligibility for GML §207-a benefits. Nor should a remedy issue under an improper 
! practice charge which interferes with pending judicial proceedings or moots the issues 
i 
raised in those proceedings. Decisions as to whether these employees are eligible for 
a restoration of their GML §207-a benefits involve questions of fact and law which 
should not be determined by us in the context of an improper practice charge where the 
issue is a refusal to bargain grounded upon unilateral change, not an individual's 
eligibility for benefits. The refusal to bargain inherent in the City's promulgation of GML 
§207-a hearing procedures without having satisfied its duty to negotiate those 
procedures is fuiiy and fairiy remedied by an order rescinding those procedures and 
preventing the City from implementing them unilaterally. 
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For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, the Association's exceptions 
are granted and the ALJ's decision and order is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City immediately rescind and cease 
implementation of any hearing procedures to be used for the purpose of determining or 
^assistingjiivithJheJeierminatioj^^^ 
§207-a and to sign and post notice in the form attached in all locations at which notices 
of information to employees in the Association's unit are posted. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW-YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Syracuse in the unit represented by the Syracuse Fire Fighters 
Association, Local 280, IAFF, AFL-CIO that the City will immediately rescind and cease implementation of 
any hearing procedures to be used for the purpose of determining or assisting with the determination of a 
unit employee's eligibility for benefits under General Municipal Law §207-a. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY OF SYRACUSE 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, 
Charging Party; — 
- and - CASE NO. U-19950 
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF 
MOUNT VERNON, INC., 
Respondent. 
RAINS AND POGREBIN, P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL and SHARON N. 
BERLIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
BUNYAN & BAUMGARTNER, LLP (RICHARD P. BUNYAN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions filed, respectively, by 
the City of Mount Vernon (City) and the Police Association of the City of Mount Vernon, 
Inc. (Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The City alleges 
in its charge that the Association refused to negotiate in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it submitted to compulsory interest 
arbitration a demand concerning a disciplinary procedure for the police officers it 
represents. The Association's proposal would afford its unit employees the option to 
contest discipline under either the procedures of Civil Service Law (CSL) §75 or in final 
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and binding arbitration. The City argues that the demand is at least nonmandatory, if 
not prohibited, because it would have the effect, if negotiated or awarded, of repealing 
or modifying provisions of its Charter. Under the Charter, the City's Police 
Commissioner is vested with the exclusive authority to discipline police officers under 
specified-procedures.-According-to-the-City, -CSL-§Z6(4^minimally~exempts-it-from»a 
duty to negotiate any proposal for an alternative disciplinary system. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge, finding nothing to reflect a plain and clear 
legislative intent to prohibit negotiations about discipline or to exempt the City from its 
duty to negotiate that term and condition of employment. 
The City argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's decision is incorrect because it 
misconstrues CSL §76(4) as interpreted. The Association argues that the ALJ was 
correct in all but his conclusion that the conversion theory of negotiability established 
under our recent decision in City of Cohoes^ (hereafter Cohoes) does not apply in this 
case. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, including 
those at oral argument, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The grounds for the imposition of discipline and the procedures for the review of 
that discipline are unquestionably terms and conditions of employment.2 The City is, 
131 PERB P020, appeal dismissed as premature, 31 PERB fi7017 (Sup. Ct. Alb. 
County 1998) (appeal pending). 
2Binghamton Civil Serv. Forum v. City ofBinghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 11 PERB 
H7508 (1978); City of Buffalo (Police Dep't), 23 PERB 1J3050 (1990). 
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therefore, required upon demand to negotiate and arbitrate disciplinary procedures 
unless other state legislation plainly and clearly expresses a legislative intention to 
exempt the City from that duty to negotiate. 
The City argues that this necessary legislative intent is found in CSL §76(4), 
-whieh-provides-as-follows:-
Nothing contained in section seventy-five or seventy six of this 
chapter shall be construed to repeal or modify any general, special 
or local law or charter provision relating to the removal or 
suspension of officers or employees in the competitive class of the 
civil service of the state or any civil division. Such sections may be 
supplemented, modified or replaced by agreements negotiated 
between the state and an employee organization pursuant to article 
fourteen of the chapter. Where such sections are so 
supplemented, modified or replaced, any employee against whom 
charges have been preferred prior to the effective date of such 
supplementation, modification or replacement shall continue to be 
subject to the provisions of such sections as in effect on the date 
such charges were preferred. 
The City's argument rests on the first sentence of CSL §76(4), as interpreted. 
We reject the City's argument because it produces a result which is wholly 
inconsistent with the policies and the terms of the Act and both the language of CSL 
§76(4) and the timing of its enactment. 
Collective bargaining about terms and conditions of employment is the strong 
and sweeping policy of this State3. Bargaining about so basic and so important a term 
3E.g., Webster Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 619, 23 PERB 1J7013 
(1990); Vestal Employees Ass'n v. PERB A.D.2d _ , 32 PERB 1J7007 (3d Dep't 
1999) (Education Law does not plainly exempt school districts from a duty to negotiate 
the subcontract of printing services to a BOCES). 
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and condition of employment as discipline should not be precluded or preempted by a 
statute that is silent about a municipality's bargaining obligations4. 
The first sentence in CSL §76(4), upon which the City relies, was enacted in 
1958. The Act became effective in 1967. We agree with the Appellate Division, Third 
Department-s-QbseFvation~thata-law-passed-long-before4here-wasany-duty-to 
negotiate says little or nothing about the Legislature's intention to exempt a party to a 
bargaining relationship from a duty to negotiate a term and condition of employment. 
Although CSL §76(4) was amended in 1970 and 1972, to add, respectively, the 
second and third sentences, these amendments relate only to the State's authority to 
negotiate alternatives to the disciplinary system in CSL §75 and §76. An authorization 
) to negotiate alternatives to the state disciplinary system, one extended to municipalities 
by interpretation6, cannot be construed to support a legislative intent to exempt a 
municipality from a duty to negotiate that term and condition of employment. To the 
contrary, we find the amendments to be persuasive evidence of an intent to require 
negotiations about discipline notwithstanding local laws on that subject. There is no 
persuasive reason to conclude from CSL §76(4) that the Legislature intended 
municipalities to bargain alternatives to the disciplinary provisions in CSL §§75 and 76, 
ASchenectady Police Benevolent Ass'n v. PERB, 85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB 1J7005 
(1995) (medical confidentiality waiver mandatorily negotiable as statute silent in 
relevant resnectV 
5Auburn Police Local 195 v. PERB, 62 A.D.2d 12, 11 PERB 1f7003 (3d Dep't 
1978), aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 1034, 12 PERB 1J7006 (1979) (hereafter Auburn). 
6ld. 
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but exempted those municipalities having local laws about discipline from a duty to 
negotiate alternatives to those local law disciplinary systems. 
The intent to require negotiations about discipline notwithstanding local laws on 
that subject is reinforced in §204-a.1 of the Act. That section, requiring legislative 
approval-of-anyGontract-term-requiringan-amendment-of law-to-permit its -
implementation, expressly contemplates bargaining about terms and conditions of 
employment which are covered by local law, notwithstanding those local laws. 
Whatever agreement may be reached with respect to those terms and conditions of 
employment may be the subject of subsequent legislative approval before the 
agreement becomes binding, but the existence of the local law covering the term and 
; condition of employment is not itself a bar to negotiations. 
The actual language of CSL §76(4) is directly contrary to the City's argument. 
CSL §76(4), in relevant part, is addressed to a concern arising from the effect of the 
Legislature's enactment of a state-wide disciplinary system. CSL §76(4) provides only 
that the enactment of one disciplinary scheme, i.e. CSL §§75 and 76, shall not itself be 
deemed to repeal or modify a then existing local disciplinary system. By stating that 
"nothing contained in section seventy-five or seventy-six... shall be construed to repeal 
or modify" local laws on discipline, the Legislature only ensured that the state 
disciplinary system would not repeal or modify local systems. CSL §76(4) does not 
declare anything about whether alternatives to those local disciplinary systems must be 
negotiated upon demand made by the union representative of a municipality's 
employees. 
Board - U-19950 -6 
Having said this, we recognize, however, that the City's argument is plainly 
supported by judicial interpretations of CSL §76(4). There is language in decisions 
from the Appellate Divisions in the First7 and Second Departments8 which would 
support the conclusion that CSL §76(4) is intended to at least exempt municipalities 
having-a-loeal law on-disGipline-from-any-duty-tobargain-about that-subjecMf not-to 
prohibit such negotiations. We believe, however, that those Appellate Division 
decisions can be fairly distinguished from the case before us. 
The two cases before the Appellate Division Second Department involved 
interpretations of state law disciplinary provisions, not local laws, and those cases did 
not involve negotiability issues directly. 
The Appellate Division First Department's decision in MacDonald, however, did 
involve an interpretation of a local disciplinary law and a negotiability determination 
made by the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining. MacDonald, however, can 
be read to hold only that the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, part of the City 
of New York's administrative code, was never intended to have police discipline be a 
mandatory subject of negotiation because other provisions of local law vested the City's 
police commissioner with the exclusive right and responsibility to discipline police 
officers. In effect, the Court in MacDonald may have grounded its decision, 
7City of New York v. MacDonald (hereafter MacDonald), 201 A.D.2d 258, 27 
PERB H7503 (1st Dep't 1994). 
^Rockland County PBA v. Town ofClarkstown, 149 A.D.2d 516, 22 PERB 1J7516 
(2d Dep't 1989); Town of Greenburgh v. Police Ass'n of the Town of Greenburgh, Inc., 
94 A.D.2d 771, 16 PERB 1(7510 (2d Dep't 1983). 
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notwithstanding the comments about CSL §76(4), upon an assessment of legislative 
intent derived from an interpretation of different parts of local laws. The same 
conclusion as to the State Legislature's intent need not be derived from the enactment 
of state laws at different times on different subjects. 
___„._ -Havingoffered-bases-todistinguish-theAppellate Divisions' decisionsr-we do-not 
minimize the import of the language in those decisions regarding CSL §76(4). Those 
decisions can stand for a proposition that CSL §76(4) is intended to make any attempt 
to change any local law relating to discipline through collective negotiations 
impermissible. 
To the extent the cited Appellate Division decisions can not be fairly 
distinguished, we do not follow them. First, they conflict with the many Court of 
Appeals' decisions endorsing the sweeping scope of negotiations concerning terms and 
conditions of employment. Second, for the reasons previously stated, those cases give 
CSL §76(4) a plainly erroneous interpretation in our opinion. Third, the Appellate 
Division decisions from the First and Second Departments are inconsistent with the 
Appellate Division, Third Department's decision in Auburn,9 as affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals. 
In Auburn, the Appellate Division reversed a prior Board's decision which had 
prohibited a municipality from negotiating a disciplinary alternative to CSL §75 on the 
9Supra note 5. 
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theory that CSL §76(4) authorized only the State to negotiate disciplinary alternatives to 
CSL §75. 
Although the City is correct that Auburn did not yield a specific interpretation of 
the first sentence in CSL §76(4), the one upon which the City relies, it is the rationale in 
----- - -At/fewm-whiGhpersuades-us-thattheAssoGiation-s-demand-is-mandatorily-negotiableT-— 
Emphasizing that discipline and discharge procedures are terms and conditions 
of employment, the Court in Auburn was persuaded that CSL §76(4), passed years 
before the Act, could not reasonably be read to reflect "any intent on the part of the 
Legislature to exclude or preclude bargaining as to discipline."10 
Only a decision holding mandatorily negotiable proposals for disciplinary 
alternatives to those established by local law is consistent with the controlling decisions 
by the Court of Appeals, including Auburn. If our choice is between adhering to Court 
of Appeals' precedent favoring negotiability of terms and conditions of employment 
generally, and discipline in particular, and Appellate Division cases to the contrary to 
the extent they can not be fairly distinguished, we choose the former. If we are wrong 
in our interpretation of CSL §76(4), then reversal should be upon a decision requiring 
negotiations rather than one disallowing negotiations. 
The Association's cross-exceptions are also denied. In Cohoes, we held that all 
legal terms in a collective bargaining agreement are converted into terms and 
conditions of employment by virtue of the parties' voluntary incorporation of those terms 
1062 A.D.2d at 16, 11 PERB at 7007. 
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into their agreement. As the ALJ observed, the Cohoes conversion theory of 
negotiability does not extend to the provisions of local law. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny the exceptions and cross-exceptions 
and affirm the ALJ's decision. 
- IIIS,.JHEREEORE,_QRDERED_that_the.charga,must„be,-andjLhereb,y.is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
i^c^A^^y^l ^ - ^ - L ^ U ^ ^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GARY CLARK, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20495 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
Respondents. 
GARY CLARK, pro se 
PAULETTE THOMPSON, ESQ., for New York City Transit Authority 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Gary Clark to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his 
improper practice charge alleging that the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) 
and the Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU) violated, respectively, §209-a.1(a) 
and(d) and §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Clark was informed that his charge was deficient in several respects. He filed an 
amendment to the charge in an attempt to correct the cited deficiencies. The Director 
thereafter dismissed the charge, determining that the charge was still deficient. The 
Director held that Clark had no standing to allege a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act, 
and that the majority of his allegations were untimely. As to these few allegations which 
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concerned acts taken by the Authority within four months of the filing of the charge, 
there were no facts to evidence either the exercise of any protected rights by Clark or 
improper motivation on the part of the Authority. The Director, therefore, dismissed the 
allegations that the Authority had violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act. As against the TWU, 
-the-Director-held-that-almostall of-the-allegations-were-untimely^-The-allegations-that— 
were timely lacked any factual support for a finding that the TWU acted in an arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad faith manner in its representation of Clark. 
Clark excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that his charge is timely and that 
the facts alleged are sufficient to support a finding that the Authority and the TWU 
violated the Act. The Authority, in its response to the exceptions, argues that the 
A exceptions were untimely filed and that the Director's decision should be affirmed. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
Initially, we deal with the timeliness argument raised by the Authority. Clark 
requested and received two extensions of time to file exceptions to the Director's 
decision. His second request for an extension of time until February 16, 1999, was 
granted with the proviso that "your exceptions will be deemed timely if filed and served 
in accordance with PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) not later than February 16, 
1999". In relevant part, our Rules of Procedure provide that filing is the act of delivery 
to the Board or the act of mailing to the Board.1 Ciark's exceptions were notarized on 
1Rules, §200.10(a). 
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February 17, 1999. Therefore, the exceptions could not have been delivered or mailed 
to the Board on or before February 16, 1999, the final date set for filing. 
Our Rules with respect to the timely filing of exceptions have been strictly 
construed and there are no extraordinary circumstances present here which would 
I warrant-an-exception-to-our~Rules.^-Here,4he.exceptionsJwere-clearly-nottimelyJ:iled— 
i with us and the Authority objects to our consideration of the late exceptions. We, 
| therefore, decline to accept the exceptions. 
Even if we were to treat Clark's exceptions as timely filed, we would affirm the 
decision of the Director and dismiss the charge. Clark's allegations focus on a physical 
• 
injury he alleges he suffered while working for the Authority in 1990. He claims that in 
i . 
) connection with his reporting of this injury, disciplinary charges were filed against him 
by the Authority for filing a false document. After a disciplinary arbitration hearing, at 
which Clark was represented by the TWU, his employment with the Authority was 
terminated. During this time, Clark was proceeding with a claim before the Workers' 
Compensation Board. Over the next several years, Clark sought reconsideration of his 
termination and the eventual denial of his claims before the Workers' Compensation 
Board, with the assistance of the TWU and a private attorney.3 Throughout, Clark has 
alleged criminal activity on the part of several Authority employees in the bringing of the 
2City of Albany, 23 PERB p 0 2 7 (1990), confd, 181 A.D.2d 953, 25 PERB 
1J7002 (3d Dep't*1992). See also Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Local 1000, AFSCME, 
Nassau Local 830 and County of Nassau, 28 PERB 1J3054 (1995). 
3The pleadings are unclear as to whether the attorney was privately retained by 
Clark or retained by the TWU to represent Clark. 
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disciplinary charges against him and in failing to comply with orders of the Worker's 
Compensation Board. He has sought relief through the Authority's Office of the 
Inspector General, the Worker's Compensation Board Review Board, Governor Pataki 
and the courts. At each stage he has been denied. 
In-the-fourmonths prior-to-the-filing-otthis-charge, Clark-requested-once~again 
that the Authority investigate his allegations. A representative of the Authority 
suggested that Clark should have a TWU representative contact the Authority to try to 
put his allegations in a form which might allow for an investigation. A TWU 
representative contacted the Authority on Clark's behalf. Clark was later told by the 
Authority to stop contacting Authority employees and to have his attorney handle any 
future communications. He was also told that his complaints were still pending before 
the Inspector General's Office. 
As an individual, Clark has no standing to allege a refusal to negotiate violation 
of §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act.4 As to the alleged §209-a. 1 (a) violation by the Authority and 
the alleged §209-a.2(a) and (c) violations by the TWU, the charge is untimely as to any 
events which occurred more than four months before the filing of the charge. To the 
extent that the charge is timely filed, there are no facts alleged in the charge or the 
amendment which would support a finding that the Act was violated as alleged. There 
is simply no evidence that Clark was engaged in a protected activity, that the Authority 
*New York City Transit Auth. and Transport Workers Union, 27 PERB U3007 
(1994). 
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took any adverse action against him because of any protected activity or that the TWU 
has acted in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or motivated by bad faith. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
JTJS,T_HEREmRE,jDRDERE 
dismissed. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
PetitionerT- — 
- and - CASE NO. C-4799 
CITY OF GLENS FALLS, 
Employer. 
THOMAS M. CAPONE, for Petitioner 
BARTLETT, PONTIFF, STEWART AND RHODES, P.C. (J. LAWRENCE 
PALTROWITZ of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us upon objections filed by the City of Glens Falls (City) to a 
finding by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
that the Public Employees Federation (PEF) is eligible for certification without an 
election in the following stipulated unit of City employees: 
Included: Electrical Director, Cemetery Superintendent, WWTP 
Laboratory Chemist, Principal WWTP Operator, Chief 
WWTP Operator, Building Inspector, Plumbing Inspector, 
City Forester, Recreation Superintendent. 
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Excluded: Assessor, Assistant City Attorney, Director of 
Transportation, Superintendent of Water/Sewer, Code 
Enforcement Officer and all other employees. 
As the authorization cards submitted by PEF in support of its petition had been 
obtained more than six months before the composition of the unit was finalized, PEF 
-obtained-new-authorization-cards-from-a-majority-of-unitemployees and-it submitted 
those cards to the Director in February 1999 so that it might be certified without an 
election. By letter dated February 8, 1999, the Director informed the parties' 
representatives that PEF had demonstrated its majority status and was eligible for 
certification without an election pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules). 
The City's objections to the Director's determination were filed by mail on 
February 23, 1999. It alleges that one unit employee had revoked his authorization 
card and another had signed the authorization card upon the mistaken belief that the 
City had already recognized PEF as the bargaining agent for the unit. 
In response, PEF argues that the City's objections should not be considered 
because they were filed too late and are without merit in any event. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we adopt the 
Director's recommendation and certify PEF without an election pursuant to provisions of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules. 
Section 201.9(g)(1) of our Ruies requires objections to a Director's determination 
recommending certification without an election be filed with us "within five working days 
after [the objecting party's] receipt of the director's notification." The return receipt from 
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the Director's certified mailing shows that the City and the law firm representing it 
received the Director's letter on February 9, 1999. The attorney handling this case, 
however, was on vacation when the Director's letter arrived at his law office and he did 
not personally receive the notice until he returned from vacation. The objections were 
filed-within-two days-of-his-return _. „___ 
It is unnecessary for us to decide whether these objections were timely filed 
under the circumstances presented because the objections do not afford us a basis to 
deny PEF's certification. 
Preliminarily, we note that the City does not have a "right" to have an election 
among unit employees. The Act expressly permits certification upon documentary 
evidence of a union's majority status, and requires an election only if otherwise 
"necessary".1 Certification, however, may only issue upon proof of a union's majority 
status.2 
The City's objections are supported by an affidavit from each of two unit 
employees. One affidavit is not material to the issue before us because the employee 
who submitted that affidavit had not signed any of the authorization cards which the 
Director relied upon in making his determination that PEF had majority status. The 
affidavit from the other employee is material because without his authorization card, 
PEF has not submitted evidence of majority status and an election would be required. 
1Act §207.2. 
2Act §207.3; Rules §§201.9(g)(1) and 201.12(h). 
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For the following reasons, however, we do not find persuasive the City's request to 
have us disregard that employee's authorization card. 
The authorization card itself is a single purpose one, clear on its face. By 
signing, the employee unequivocally authorized PEF to serve as his bargaining agent. 
i 
i 
I There is no allegation-that the purpose of-the-card was misrepresented, that-the— 
employee did not understand the card or that the employee was in any way coerced 
into signing it. We are asked to disregard the card only because the employee 
incorrectly believed that PEF had already been recognized by the City. But that belief 
is not attributable to any action or inaction by PEF. For reasons known only to the 
employee, he just assumed that recognition had been extended to PEF by the City. 
1
 •' ') We recently held that we would not entertain allegations that a petitioner induced 
employees to sign a showing of interest by misrepresentations as to the purpose of a 
document they signed if the document was clear on its face.3 The same principles 
which led us to that conclusion are applicable here, but with even greater force. Here, 
we are not asked to examine conduct by a petitioner. We are asked to examine the 
motives which prompt employees to sign union designation or authorization cards. But 
employees sign authorization cards for many reasons upon any number of expectations 
or beliefs regarding union representation. To open up those motives for scrutiny when 
there has been no allegation of "misconduct" by the petitioner, and the card itself is 
clear as to its purpose, would unnecessarily and unreasonably delay the certification 
3State of New York, 31 PERB U3058 (1998). 
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process, a result plainly contrary to the policies of the Act. The alternative to an 
investigation of motive would be an automatic election any time there was any issue 
raised as to why employees in sufficient numbers to arguably affect a union's majority 
status may have signed an authorization card. But that result is equally inconsistent 
—with thepolicies of theAct favoring certification-without election . 
The one employee at issue plainly and clearly authorized PEF to serve as his 
bargaining agent. Whether he really meant it is a question we simply decline to 
investigate because investigation would compromise the policies of the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny the City's objections to the Director's 
recommendation that PEF be certified. Accordingly, we issue the following certification 
) and order to negotiate. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Public Employees Federation has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the City of Glens Falls, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described previously, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the City of Glens Falls shall negotiate 
collectively with the Public Employees Federation. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
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Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
_MichaeLR._Cuevas,._Chairman 
1/ " Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL 317, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4740 
TOWN OF DRYDEN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local 317, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All employees, except casual employees, of the Town of Dryden's 
Highway Department and Department of Public Works, including 
drivers, laborers, mechanics, maintenance employees, MEOs, 
heavy equipment operators and all other employees who regularly 
perform such work. 
Excluded-—AlUother-employees -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 317. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
el R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ # Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioners 
-and- CASE NO. C-4762 
TOWN OF OSSINING, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time employees in the titles of deputy receiver of taxes, 
deputy town clerk, assessment clerk, assistant assessment clerk, 
assessment assistant, court clerk, chauffeur, intermediate account 
clerk typist, food service helper, community service aide, and 
senior clerk. 
-Excluded:—-All-other-employees 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ ^Marc A. Abbott, Member 
<7 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FLORENCE C. IOVINO, 
_ Petitioner,: 
-and- CASE NO. C-4795 
OCEANSIDE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding- having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
-The petition sought to decertify the intervenor. 
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Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included:—AILcafeteria workers 
Excluded: Cafeteria Manager. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
MichaelR. Cuevas, Chairman 
''Marc A. Abbott, Member 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SACHEM LIBRARY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4836 
SACHEM PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sachem Library Employees Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Permanent members of the clerical staff working regularly twenty 
(20) hours or more per week employed by the Board in the Library 
and comprised of clerks, clerk-typists and stenographers. 
Excluded: Pages, principal clerk, secretary to the library director, account 
clerks, and any other of those in this group who have or may have 
duties of a-eonfidentialrmanagerialrsupeivisoryradrninistrative-or--
professional nature. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Sachem Library Employees Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Ivlarc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
_ Petitioner^ 
-and- CASE NO. C-4855 
WILLIAMSON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time employees employed 
in the following titles: teacher aide, school monitor, account 
clerk/typist, account clerk, typist, substance abuse counselor, 
administrative assistant for special education, physical therapist, 
registered school nurse, library clerk, student int specialist, AV 
coor/el school, food service helper, cleaner, cleaner/groundsman, 
maintenance mechaniGy custodian, bus driver, school chauffeur,— 
auto/mechanic, laborer. 
Excluded: All administrators, transportation supervisor, school lunch manager, 
director of facilities and operations, secretary to the superintendent, 
secretary to the assistant superintendent, accountant/treasurer, 
payroll and personnel clerk, BOCES staff, teachers unit personnel, 
substitute bus drivers, and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SACHEM SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4857 
^ACH^MTJENTRATrS'CTlO^L^TST^FCT; 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATIONS REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sachem Supervisors Association has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Director of Food Services, School Purchasing Agent, Director of 
Security, Plant Facilities Administrator, Assistant Plant Facilities 
Administrator, Safety Compliance Officer, Transportation 
Supervisor, Dispatcher and Senior Guard. 
Excluded: All others. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Sachem Supervisors Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good-faithwith respect-to wagesrhours,-and-other-terms-and conditions of employmenty 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott,l\Mmber 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
